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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 05-4085

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
HARRY G. PARKIN,
Appellant
(D.C. Crim. No. 04-cr-00162)

On Appeal From The United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
District Judge: The Honorable Garrett E. Brown, Jr.

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 19, 2008

Before: BARRY, CHAGARES, Circuit Judges, and COHILL, Jr.,* District Judge
(Opinion Filed: April 1, 2009)

OPINION

COHILL, Senior District Judge.

*

Honorable Maurice B. Cohill, Jr., Senior United States District Judge for the Western
District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.

Defendant Harry G. Parkin appeals his conviction for twelve counts of mail fraud,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1346 and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and one count of attempted
extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). We will affirm.
I.
Harry G. Parkin is an attorney and former prosecutor for Mercer County, New
Jersey. From 1995 to December 31, 2003, Parkin served as the Chief of Staff to Robert
Prunetti, the Mercer County Executive. Among other things, Parkin served as the County
Executive’s liaison to the governing board of the Mercer County Improvement Authority
(“MCIA”). The MCIA is an autonomous agency within Mercer County established to
conduct municipal finance and oversee development projects for the County. Relevant to
this case, the MCIA is the agency responsible for overseeing the solid waste and recycling
collection programs in the County.
The contract for curbside recycling pickup in Mercer County was due to expire at
the end of 1999. The MCIA was unhappy with the current contractor, Waste
Management, and put the contract up for bid. After Waste Management was the only
bidder, Parkin contacted the Executive Director of the MCIA, James Lambert, to let him
know that a top contributor to the Republican Party, Alex Abdalla, was interested in
bidding on the contract. The MCIA decided to rebid the contract. The only bidders in the
second round were Waste Management and Abdalla’s company, Central Jersey Waste &
Recycling (“CJW&R”). The contract was awarded to CJW&R.
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In July 2000, Lambert resigned from the MCIA and joined CJW&R as its
President. Due to CJW&R’s financial difficulties Abdalla and Lambert approached
Parkin to ask him to invest in CJW&R. Parkin desired to join forces with Lambert and
Abdalla so that each would become a one-third owner of the company. However, he
wanted to conceal his interest in the company due to his position as Chief of Staff of the
Mercer County Executive and because CJW&R had the recycling contract with the
County. Parkin sought to conceal his interest in CJW&R by first drafting a stock-option
agreement providing for Lambert to purchase a two-thirds interest in CJW&R from
Abdalla. Parkin’s actual, concealed one-third interest in the company would be protected
through a secret side agreement he would have with Lambert. This deal eventually fell
through.
To help with CJW&R’s financial difficulties, Parkin agreed to loan the company
$150,000 at a 15% interest rate, but again sought to conceal his interest in the company.
This was accomplished through the use of a sham loan showing that Parkin was loaning
$150,000 to PMT Contracting Company, a company owned by Abdalla’s nephew. The
$150,000 was actually given to CJW&R, and payments on the loan were made from the
company’s funds to Parkin. Parkin failed to disclose the source of interest income he
received from the loan on mandatory state ethics disclosure forms for calendar year 2000,
and failed to file any forms for calendar year 2001.
Thereafter, Parkin, Lambert, and Abdalla sought other avenues to enable each of
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the three men to gain a one-third ownership interest in the company. At the same time,
however, Abdalla sought financing from other persons, in particular, Frank Fiumefreddo
and his son. The Fiumefreddos loaned CJW&R $250,000 in exchange for an option for
51% ownership in the company and the right to manage CJW&R.
After the Fiumefreddos took over management responsibilities, Abdalla decided he
did not like the new arrangement. Meanwhile, Parkin was concerned that the interest
payments on his loan might stop under the Fiumefreddos management. He thus began to
plan to have Lambert, Abdalla, and himself buy out the Fiumefreddos’ interest in the
company.
In order to ensure that Abdalla had sufficient funds to accomplish a buyout, Parkin
sought to have a demolition contract to demolish buildings on South Broad Street in
Trenton awarded to Abdalla’s company. To accomplish this, Parkin told the new
Executive Director of the MCIA, Steven Dixon, that he wanted the contract awarded to
Abdalla’s company. After two rounds of bidding, the Deputy Executive Director to the
MCIA recommended to Dixon that the contact be awarded to the company that had
proffered the low bid each time. Instead, Dixon rebid the contract two more times, and
both times CJW&R did not have the low bid. Dixon then gave CJW&R, but not the low
bidding company, a final opportunity to bid. Abdalla submitted an undated, amended bid
directly to Dixon and his company was awarded a $33,300 contract for the South Broad
Street demolition project.
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As part of his responsibilities as Chief of Staff for the Mercer County Executive
Parkin also oversaw a potential redevelopment project at the Trenton-Mercer Airport.
Parkin attempted to have an airport demolition contract, worth between $1,000,000 and
$1,400,000, awarded to CJW&R. Parkin sent Lambert to inform Abdalla that in order to
get the airport demolition contract, Abdalla would have to agree to get rid of the
Fiumefreddos and allow Parkin to obtain an ownership interest in CJW&R. However, the
company responsible for development of the site was unable to obtain financing and the
airport redevelopment deal fell through.
Parkin also employed threats in an effort to force the Fiumefreddos to sell their
interest in CJW&R. Parkin attempted to accomplish this plan by threatening to require
the elder Fiumefreddo to undergo the New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection’s licensing approval process to obtain a license to operate a waste hauling
company. This approval was necessary if Fiumefreddo ever wanted to exercise his option
to purchase 51% of CJW&R. Up to this point, Fiumefreddo had not sought approval,
apparently because of alleged ties to organized crime that had caused Fiumefreddo to give
up ownership interest in waste hauling companies in New York City. As part of this plan,
Parkin instructed an MCIA employee named Jerry Fiabane to investigate the elder
Fiumefreddo’s background and report directly back to Parkin so that he could use the
information as leverage. Parkin then instructed Fiabane to meet with the Fiumefreddos to
inform them that Fiabane had information about the elder Fiumefreddo’s ties to organized
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crime and would have to forward that information to the authorities.
Parkin also sought to force the Fiumefreddos to sell their interest in CJW&R by
threatening to withhold the 2003 renewal of the initial recycling contract, an action that
would effectively destroy the company. To accomplish this plan, Parkin instructed
Fiabane to tell Lou Calisti, the MCIA employee responsible for sending out the contract
renewal, to hold up the renewal process. Parkin then instructed Abdalla to inform the
Fiumefreddos that the contract renewals were in jeopardy as long as they remained with
the company. Finally, Parkin himself told the elder Fiumefreddo not to count on the
contracts being renewed.
On March 11, 2004, a federal grand jury returned a thirteen count indictment
against Parkin alleging twelve counts of mail fraud and one count of extortion. The
government alleged that from September 2000 through March 2003, Parkin devised a
scheme to defraud the citizens of Mercer County of their right to honest services by using
his official position to obtain contracts for CJW&R in order to protect and advance his
own financial interests; by attempting to obtain an ownership interest in CJW&R; and by
concealing material information concerning his financial interests in CJW&R from other
government officials and the public.
Trial commenced with jury selection on February 1, 2005. Before opening
statements, Parkin requested permission to proceed as co-counsel along with his attorney
David Rhoads, Esquire. The District Court, in its discretion, denied the motion for hybrid
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representation.
During a break in the government’s direct examination of its second witness,
Parkin requested permission to proceed pro se. The District Court conducted a hearing
on the matter and granted Parkin’s request. Parkin represented himself for the remainder
of the trial. At the close of the government’s case, and again at the close of evidence,
Parkin moved for judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29,
which the District Court denied.
On March 21, 2005, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all thirteen counts. On
August 30, 2005, Parkin was sentenced to 90 months’ imprisonment, a term of 3 years’
supervised release, and a fine of $26,000. He now appeals.
II.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the
District Court’s ruling that the defendant’s waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to legal
counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. United States v. Peppers, 302 F.3d 120,
127 (3d Cir. 2002). We also exercise plenary review over the District Court’s denial of a
motion for judgment of acquittal. United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 133 (3d Cir.
2005).
We review the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard to ensure that the
district court “committed no significant procedural error in arriving at its decision.” Gall
v. United States, 552 U.S. —, 128 S.Ct. 586, 597, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). “If we
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determine that the district court has committed no significant procedural error, we then
review the substantive reasonableness of the sentence under an abuse-of-discretion
standard . . . .” United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 218 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Gall, 128
S.Ct. at 597.)
III.
A.
Parkin’s first argument is that the District Court erred in granting his request to
represent himself at trial. We find no error.
Our review of the District Court’s extensive colloquy with Parkin shows that
Parkin’s waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Parkin concedes that the
District Court “conducted an exhaustive examination of [Parkin], in accordance with
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) and its progeny . . . .” (Appellant’s Br. at 21.)
His argument is squarely focused on his assertion that his waiver of the right to counsel
was not voluntary because he was coerced into pro se representation based on the District
Court’s denial of his request for hybrid representation.1

1

Parkin also argues that his waiver of the right to counsel was not knowing and
intelligent because he had not engaged in the practice of law for the past eight years, he
had not participated in a federal trial since 1986, and he was not familiar with the
Sentencing Guidelines. As the government points out, valid waivers of the right to
counsel are regularly made by defendants who are not attorneys and who have never
practiced criminal law. Moreover, “technical legal knowledge” is “not relevant to an
assessment of [a defendant’s] knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.” Faretta,
422 U.S. at 836.
8

As noted, the District Court in its discretion denied Parkin’s request to act as cocounsel alongside Rhoads. He does not challenge that ruling, and admits that it was a
matter left to the court’s discretion. When Parkin, through Rhoads, informed the District
Court that he wished to proceed pro se, the District Court undertook a careful and
exhaustive inquiry into the matter.
First, the District Court asked Rhoads to formally place the request on the record.
(Defendant’s Appendix, “D.A.”, at 64.) After Rhoads stated his understanding that
Parkin wished to proceed as his own counsel, the District Court immediately
acknowledged that its next responsibility was to “find out what the defendant’s current
position is and what it is that he wants to do.” (Id. at 69.) The District Court then briefly
set forth the applicable law regarding a waiver of the right to counsel, placed Parkin
under oath, and asked him if he wanted to discharge Rhoads and take over his own
defense. Parkin answered that he did. The Court then undertook an inquiry with Parkin
as to why he wanted to proceed pro se, and Parkin explained at length his reasons.
Rhoads again stated that his client wished to proceed pro se and that he was in agreement
with this decision.
The attorney for the government offered his view that Parkin’s request to proceed
pro se was not clear because on one hand it seemed as if Rhoads was saying that the
attorney client relationship had broken down, and on the other hand that it would be
acceptable to Parkin if Rhoads was appointed as his standby counsel. In response,
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Rhoads stated:
It’s very, very clear. Mr. Parkin made an application to be cocounsel. It was denied. We’re not even going to revisit that at this point.
He is now saying to this Court he wants to proceed pro se. I am totally in
agreement with that. Our situation is such that I don’t have his confidence - or perhaps I should say I don’t have the confidence that I have his
confidence in my being his defense attorney. He is a defense attorney. All
I suggested to the Court, and Mr. Parkin is in agreement, that I would act as
standby counsel. That’s a far cry from co-counsel.
(D.A. at 84.) The District Court then asked Parkin whether he agreed with what Rhoads
said, and Parkin replied that he did. Parkin further explained as follows:
The Court ruled on our previous motion which is what we think we
would have liked to have seen. Now we cannot be there at the preferred
place. Now we are moving into a different mode because this is the only
way that I can achieve and we can achieve what we want to do, an
opportunity to allow me to participate in the defense. The Court has said
the only way that will happen is if I am pro se. I would prefer co-counsel,
but pro se is where we are right now, Your Honor, because that is the only
alternative that’s open.
(Id. at 86.)
At this point the District Court stated that it was going to conduct an inquiry into
Parkin’s request to proceed pro se and the waiver of his right to counsel. In consultation
with the parties, it was decided that the hearing would take place the following morning.
When the hearing began, the District Court first set forth in great detail the
procedural history relevant to Defendant’s desire to serve as co-counsel and his current
desire to proceed pro se. Thereafter, and again in great detail, the Court set forth the
applicable law. Before beginning a colloquy with Parkin, the District Court cited
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Parkin’s apparent reluctance to proceed pro se in light of the Court’s denial of his request
to serve as co-counsel and thus questioned whether Parkin had clearly and unequivocally
asserted his desire to proceed pro se. Parkin again stated his reasons for wanting to
proceed pro se, and stated that because his request to proceed as co-counsel had been
denied, that he was “faced with an issue of do I proceed pro se or do I proceed with Mr.
Rhoads as my attorney?” (Id. at 124.) Thus, the question of to what extent the District
Court’s denial of the request for hybrid representation influenced Parkin’s decision to
proceed pro se was at the forefront of the colloquy.
The Court then conducted a thorough and searching inquiry. Relevant to the
instant issue of voluntariness the District Court asked Parkin the following general
questions:
Q. Are you making this decision freely and does it represent your personal
desire?
A. Yes.
Q. Is this decision a result of any compulsion or coercion?
A. No.
(Id. at 150.) The District Court then specifically asked Parkin about the effect the Court’s
prior denial of his request for hybrid representation had on Parkin’s decision to proceed
pro se:
Q. The cases have indicated that hybrid representation is disfavored as I
have said before. Your decision to represent yourself, is that influenced by
my denial of the right of hybrid representation.
11

A. Certainly.
(Id. at 151.) The District Court then asked a more direct question:
Q. . . . . So in other words this is not a free and voluntary decision
because it is you say made because I denied you the right to appear together
with Mr. Rhoads, is that right?
A. I disagree with that, Judge. This is a free and voluntary decision based
on the rulings of the Court and the facts that we are facing right at this
particular point in time. I don’t disagree with the Court’s ruling. The Court
had the discretion to make that ruling, you’ve made it. Now we’re moving
on to how do we proceed in light of the Court’s ruling? I don’t think we
can sit here and say the Court’s ruling had nothing to do with what we’re
doing here today.
Q. But you’re not saying that this is a compelled decision or involuntary
decision because the Court has ruled?
A. I didn’t say that.
Q. Okay. That’s my question because I have to make a determination
whether this is a free and voluntary decision and you’re telling me it is free
and voluntary, is that right?
A. Yes. Sure.
(Id. at 151-52.)
Parkin clearly indicated that he was distinguishing between whether the Court’s
prior ruling was a factor in his decision to voluntarily proceed pro se and whether the
Court’s prior ruling compelled him to decide to proceed pro se. He unequivocally stated
that his decision was voluntary and was not compelled. Parkin was faced with the
constitutionally acceptable choice of either proceeding with counsel who was prepared
and competent, or proceeding pro se. The District Court correctly found that Parkin’s
12

decision was knowing and voluntary.
B.
Parkin next argues that the District Court erred in failing to grant his motion for
judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 on all thirteen counts.
“A motion for judgment of acquittal should be denied if, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States
v. Jimenez, 513 F.3d 62, 72 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123,
133 (3d Cir. 2005).
Parkin argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish honest services mail
fraud in several ways. First, he argues that a scheme to defraud was not established
because there was insufficient evidence showing official action in relation to CJW&R as
opposed to evidence regarding official action relating to awarding contracts to Abdalla’s
demolition company. He further argues that the evidence was insufficient to show a
scheme to defraud in that the scheme to steer demolition contracts to Abdalla in exchange
for an ownership interest in CJW&R was a legal impossibility because Fiumefreddo
owned 51% of the stock. Similarly, he argues that it was a legal impossibility for Parkin
to steer the airport contract to Abdalla since the awarding of that contract would occur by
a private company. Finally, Parkin argues that the evidence was insufficient in that the
evidence showed that Parkin did not have control or influence over the MCIA.
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The evidence was sufficient to establish that Parkin took official actions that
furthered his undisclosed interest in CJW&R. The government presented evidence that
Parkin attempted in a variety of ways to get the Fiumefreddos to sell their interest in
CJW&R in order to ensure that he continued to receive interest payments on his loan and
to secure his own interest in CJW&R. Parkin furthered these goals by instructing Fiabane
to withhold renewal of the CJW&R contract, by instructing Fiabane to conduct an
investigation into the elder Fiumefreddo’s alleged ties to organized crime, and by
instructing Fiabane to meet with the Fiumefreddos to pressure them into relinquishing
their ownership. In addition, Parkin furthered his concealed interest in CJW&R by using
his position to try to steer demolition contracts to Abdalla’s demolition company. These
actions were undertaken in an effort to ensure that Parkin, Abdalla, and Lambert all had
sufficient funds so that each could eventually purchase a one-third interest in CJW&R.
The government supported this evidence with testimony from Abdalla, Lambert, and
Fiabane, and with recorded conversations in which Parkin himself corroborated the
evidence.
Parkin’s allegation that the mail fraud schemes were impossible also fails. Mail
fraud schemes need not succeed; the law is clear that the fraud is complete upon mailing.
United States v. Frey, 42 F.3d 795, 800 (3d Cir. 1995). In addition, the mail fraud
charges against Parkin charged not only the execution of the mail fraud schemes, but also
the “attempt” to execute the schemes. By charging an attempt, the jury could premise
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guilt on the defendant’s intent to defraud even if the scheme was unsuccessful.
The evidence was also sufficient to establish that in fact it was not an
“impossibility” that Parkin’s scheme to steer contracts to Abdalla would further his goal
of gaining an ownership interest in CJW&R. The Fiumefreddos did not own 51% of
CJW&R. Instead, in exchange for investing $250,000 in CJW&R, the Fiumefreddos
were given management control and had an option to purchase 51% of CJW&R. Parkin’s
scheme included an effort to get the Fiumefreddos to relinquish this interest, as well as
efforts to ensure that Parkin, Lambert, and Abdalla had sufficient funds to buy the
Fiumefreddos out. Thus, the plan was not impossible.
With regard to the airport demolition contract, the evidence was sufficient to allow
the jury to determine that Parkin could influence the company that was in charge of
awarding the demolition contract. The government introduced a tape recording of Parkin
explaining that he could make the airport deal happen and that he had taken the necessary
steps to ensure that it would happen. Finally, there was an abundance of evidence
showing that Parkin was able to control the MCIA.
Next, Parkin argues that he should been granted judgment of acquittal on the sole
charge of attempting to commit extortion under color of official right or by wrongful use
of fear of economic harm because there was no evidence that the Fiumefreddos were
ever in fear of economic harm. However, the District Court correctly instructed the jury,
and Parkin did not object, that it was not necessary that the government prove the “actual
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generation of fear.” (Supplemental Appendix, “S.A.”, at 629.) See United States v.
Marsh, 26 F.3d 14965, 1500-01 (9th Cir. 2004) (“For attempted extortion, ‘the victim’s
state of mind is not important. What is important is that the defendant attempted to instill
fear in the victim.’”) (quoting United States v. Ward, 914 F.2d 1340, 1347 (9th Cir.
1990)). The District Court properly denied Parkin’s motion for judgment of acquittal.
C.
Parkin’s final argument is that the District Court erred in calculating his
Sentencing Guideline range, and that the ultimate sentence imposed was unreasonable.
We find no error.
The District Court applied U.S.S.G. § 2C1.7 to the mail fraud counts, and U.S.S.G.
§ 2C1.1 to the extortion count.2 The attempted extortion count carried a base offense
level of 10 pursuant to section 2C1.1(a). Eight levels were added pursuant to section
2C1.1(b)(2)(B) because the offense involved payments for the purpose of influencing a
high-level public official, to arrive at a total offense level for the attempted extortion
count of 18.
The mail fraud counts carried a base offense level of 10. Fourteen levels were
added pursuant to section 2C1.7(b)(1)(A), based on a loss calculation of more than
$400,000 but less than $1,000,000. Four levels were added pursuant to section 3B1.1(a)

2

The 2002 edition of the Guidelines Manual was used in this case. Effective
November 1, 2004, section 2C1.7 was consolidated with section 2C1.1.
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for Parkin’s leadership role in the offense as an organizer or leader of a criminal activity
that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive. Thus, the total
offense level for the mail fraud counts was 28.
By applying section 3D1.2 and section 3D1.3(b) to the two groups of offenses, the
District Court arrived at an overall total offense level of 28. With a criminal history
category of I, the District Court determined that the applicable advisory guideline range
of imprisonment was 78 to 97 months.
Parkin first contends that the District Court should have applied section 2B1.1 to
the mail fraud counts instead of section 2C1.7. We disagree. The Sentencing Guidelines
indicate that for convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1341, the appropriate guideline section to
apply is either 2B1.1 or 2C1.7. U.S.S.G. App. A, at 472. In cases where more than one
section is applicable for a conviction, the Guidelines direct courts to use the the most
appropriate guideline section for the offense conduct of conviction. U.S.S.G. App. A,
intro, at 463. Parkin was convicted of being a public official who deprived the citizens of
Mercer County of their intangible right to honest services. Section 2C1.7 is titled in
relevant part: “Fraud Involving Deprivation of the Intangible Right to the Honest Services
of Public Officials,” whereas section 2B1.1 more generally applies to larceny, theft,
fraud, deceit, and other economic crimes. There is no doubt that the District Court
applied the appropriate guideline section.
Parkin next argues that the District Court erred in adding four levels to his offense
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level for being a leader of criminal activity that involved five or more participants. The
five participants were Parkin, Abdalla, Lambert, Abdalla’s nephew, and Fiabane. Parkin
objects to the inclusion of Abdalla’s nephew and Fiabane arguing that they were
unwitting participants and were not criminally culpable. In addition, Parkin argues that
there was no evidence that he exercised any control over Abdalla’s nephew and Fiabane.
To be included as a “participant” in a criminal activity under section 3B1.1(a), one
may either be criminally responsible for the charged offense or “used to facilitate the
criminal scheme.” United States v. Inigo, 925 F.2d 641, 659 (3d Cir. 1991). It is not
necessary that the “participant” is guilty of the charged offense asserted against the
defendant, “so long as their own criminal conduct made [commission of the offense]
possible.” Id.
The evidence demonstrated that Abdalla’s nephew was aware that he entered into a
written loan on behalf of his company but that the loan was not actually given to his
company. He further understood that the purpose of the sham loan was to protect
Parkin’s interest in CJW&R. Thus, Abdalla’s nephew was not an unwitting participant
and in fact aided and abetted Parkin’s criminal scheme.
As to Fiabane, the evidence shows that he took his instructions directly from
Parkin in order to advance Parkin’s scheme. Upon instruction from Parkin, Fiabane
ensured that renewal of CJW&R contract was upheld, conducted an investigation into
Fiumefreddo’s alleged ties to organized crime, and met with the Fiumefreddos to pressure
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them into relinquishing their ownership. Fiabane’s actions were not the actions of an
unwitting participant; rather, he aided and abetted Parkin’s scheme.
We find no error with the District Court’s 4 level increase for Parkin’s leadership role in
criminal activity that involved five or more participants.
Next, Parkin argues that the District Court erred in calculating the amount of loss
pursuant to section 2B1.1(b)(1)(H). The District Court calculated that the loss was
greater than $400,000 but less than $1,000,000, resulting in a 14 level increase in Parkin’s
offense level.
Parkin argues that there was no evidence of government loss due to Abdalla
receiving the $33,300 South Broad Street demolition contract. In addition, he argues that
no loss value should be attributed to the airport demolition contract because the contract
was never awarded and the government did not establish the value of the contract.
Finally, Parkin argues that the government cannot rely on loss attributed to Parkin’s
scheme to obtain an interest in CJW&R because there was no evidence of the fair market
value of CJW&R, and no evidence to support a reasonable valuation of the company.
Therefore, Parkin argues, the District Court should have used as an alternative measure
the gain that resulted from this offense pursuant to section 2B1.1 app.n. 2(B). Because
the evidence showed no loss by the government, Parkin claims there should have been no
increase in his base offense level.
The language of section 2C1.7, however, explicitly sets forth that a defendant’s
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base offense level will be enhanced by the greater of either the loss to the government or
“the value of anything obtained or to be obtained by a public official or others acting with
a public official.” U.S.S.G. § 2C1.7(b)(1)(A). Specifically, this section provides as
follows:
If the loss to the government, or the value of anything obtained or to be
obtained by a public official or others acting with a public official,
whichever is greater (i) exceeded $2,000 but did not exceed $5,000,
increase by 1 level; or (ii) exceeded $5,000, increase by the number of
levels from the table in § 2B1.1 (Theft, Property Destruction, and Fraud)
corresponding to that amount.
Id. (emphasis added). Here, Abdalla was acting with Parkin. Thus it was proper for the
District Court to attribute as loss to Parkin not only the value of anything he himself
obtained or he intended to obtain, but also the value of anything Abdalla obtained or that
Parkin intended Abdalla to obtain. United States v. Antico, 273 F.3d 245, 271 (3d Cir.
2001).
As a result of Parkin’s offenses Abdalla obtained or sought to obtain two contracts.
The value of the South Broad Street demolition contract was $33,300 and the value of the
airport demolition contract that Parkin attempted to steer to Abdalla was approximately
$1,000,000. These two contracts together are sufficient to support the 14 level increase
awarded by the District Court.
In addition, the amount of loss calculated for purposes of this enhancement is also
supported by the value of the one-third interest in CJW&R that Parkin attempted to obtain
for himself and the value of the one-third interest he attempted to obtain for Lambert.
20

The evidence in the record supports that the value of each one-third ownership interest
attempted to be obtained was approximately $500,000, for a total amount of $1,000,000.
We find no error with the District Court assigning a loss value under sections 2C1.7 and
2B1.1 greater than $400,000 and less than $1,000,000, and adding 14 levels to Parkin’s
base offense level.
Finally, Parkin argues that by not imposing the lowest range of the guideline
sentence range, the sentence imposed by the District Court was not reasonable. He
contends that the District Court failed to consider his personal factors, his service to the
United States army, and his service to the community.
We reject Parkin’s claim that his sentence is unreasonable. The District Court
stated at sentencing as follows:
This is a sad situation. Everything that I see indicates that before this
period of time the defendant was [a] well respected, highly successful
attorney, he served honorably in the nation’s military and was respected by
a number of people and indeed served as the person responsible for the
ethics in the county.
(D.A. at 240.) The District Court noted that Parkin was “very highly respected,” and that
“[p]eople say a lot of good things about him . . . .” (Id. at 240.) The District Court read
from a letter Parkin wrote to the Court in which Parkin cited his long years in public
service as well as his military service. (Id. at 243.) The District Court considered this
letter as well as “the letters of all the people that knew Parkin and spoke well of him.”
(Id. at 243.)
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Our review of the entire sentencing hearing shows that the District Court gave
thoughtful consideration to the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) before
pronouncing a reasonable sentence of 90 months of imprisonment, a sentence within the
advisory guideline range of 78 to 97 months’ imprisonment. United States v. Schweitzer,
454 F.3d 197, 204 (3d Cir. 2006) (Court of Appeals reviews a sentence under a standard
that “requires a deferential review of the record developed by the district court to
determine whether the final sentence, wherever it may lie within the permissible statutory
range, was premised upon appropriate and judicious consideration of the relevant
factors.”); see also United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 330-32 (3d Cir. 2006).
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of
conviction and sentence.
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